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istrative action. Judicially, this may be accomplished by engrafting
an exception on the Silverman doctrine by including short term
straddles (i.e., matched puts and calls for options issued for less than
six months) within the scope of section x6(b). This would be difficult,
however, in view of the technical rationale set forth by both the
District and Circuit Courts in Silverman.
The better remedy rests with the Securities Exchange Commission.
Administratively, the Commission has the power to bar insiders from
issuing or acquiring put and call options singly as well as in combi-
nation. This power exists pursuant to sections 9 (b), (c) of the act.
3
5 It is
submitted that the Commission should exercise this power and avoid
the problem of the insider realizing short-swing profits which now
can be obtained with immunity under the doctrine of Silverman.
RIcHARD L. RosE
ECONOMIC INTEREST AND DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
FOR MINING CONTRACTORS
In recognition that minerals, oil, gas and other natural deposits
are wasting assets and that capital is consumed in the process of
extracting these deposits from the earth, a reasonable depletion al-
lowance deduction' is accorded to a taxpayer who has an economic
"Sections 9(b) and 9(c) of the act give the Commission rule-making power
with respect to the acquisition, endorsement and guarantee of any put, call, straddle
or other option." The Commission has been reluctant to utilize this power in the
past, presumably because the anti-manipulative weapons have worked so well.
The Commission has sought to avoid the needless hampering of the legitimate use
of options. Loss, Securities Regulation 1544 (2d ed. 1961).
There are principally two ways in which the Commission may assert its views
as to the proper interpretation of the statute and avoid utilizing its rule-making
powers. One is by issuing an opinion as to its views in the form of a press release,
letter, or informal statement. This method is not feasible here since the Commission
does not have any function in the enforcement of private litigation under § 16(b),
and does not undertake to predict how the courts might resolve the enforcement
of private actions under § i6(b). Administrative interpretations relating to § 16(b)
are rendered by the second method, i.e., when an issue of sufficient importance
is raised concerning the administration of the act, the Commission may request
permission to file a brief as amicus curiae (as in Silverman). Cook and Feldman,
Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 38 7- 88
(1953).
'This allowance is deductible from gross income in determining adjusted gross
income for federal tax purposes. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 62(5), (6).
19631 CASE COMMENTS
interest in such deposits.2 The depletion allowance deduction is in-
tended to compensate the taxpayer for the exhaustion of assets con-
sumed in the production of income.3
A mineral owner, a royalty owner,4 a long-term lessee and an over-
riding royalty owner3 clearly have an economic interest in the mineral
deposit. Without question, they are entitled to the benefit of the
depletion allowance.6
"In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, [and] other natural deposits .... there
shall be allowed as a deduction in computing taxable income a reasonable allow-
ance for depletion and for depreciation of improvements, according to the peculiar
conditions in each case; such reasonable allowance in all cases to be made under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate." Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 61(a).
Pursuant to the authority delegated, the regulations provide: "Annual de-
pletion deductions are allowed only to the owner of an economic interest in the
mineral deposit. ... An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the
taxpayer has acquired by investment any interest in the mineral in place...,
and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of
the mineral. .. , to which he must look for a return of his capital. But a person
who has no capital investment in the mineral deposit.., does not possess an eco-
nomic interest merely because through a contractual relation he possesses a mere
economic or pecuniary advantage derived from production. For example, an agree-
ment between the owner of an economic interest and another entitling the latter
to purchase or process the product upon production or entitling the latter to
compensation for extraction ... does not convey a depletable economic interest."
Tres. Reg. § .611-1(b) 1 (1963).
3Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 366 (1938). There are presently
two kinds of depletion allowances in connection with natural deposits. They are
cost depletion (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 612) and percentage depletion (Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 613). Whichever method will produce the greater deduction is the
method taxpayer, in any particular year, is presently required to use. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 613 (d). See 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 24-35, following n.i3
(196o). Only the percentage depletion method is dealt with in this comment.
The percentage allowance "is subject to both of two limitations, namely, to a
prescribed fraction of the 'gross income from the property' and also to 5o% of
the 'taxable income from the property.' In the case of oil and gas wells, the fraction
in the first limitation is 271/2%; in the case of other various types of mineral prop-
erties, that fraction varies from 5% to 23%. Inasmuch as neither of the two limi-
tations bears any relationship to cost, it is readily apparent that through percent-
age depletion a taxpayer may recover more than his cost over the life of the prop-
erty." 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 24.31(a) (196o). See Commissioner
v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956).
'An example of a royalty interest is as follows: Mineral owner A sells his min-
eral rights to B, reserving to himself, his heirs and assigns, a percentage of any
mineral extracted. A owns a royalty interest.
&An example of an over-riding royalty is as follows: B leases mineral rights
from owner A. Then B assigns the lease to C, reserving to himself, his heirs and
assigns, a percentage of the mineral extracted by C, his agents or assigns. An
overriding royalty interest is owned by B. See 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation
§ 24.-23(a) n.58 (196o).
OBurton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946) (holding that an
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As is sometimes the case, especially in the coal mining industry,
a mineral owner or a long-term lessee may enter into a contract with
an independent contractor for the extraction of the mineral, oil, gas
or other natural deposit, which is then to be sold by one or the other
of the parties to the contract.1 A difficult problem exists as to such ar-
rangements: whether or not the depletion allowance deduction is
available to the independent contractor.8 Agreements of this nature
are often so complex and intricate that the problem is difficult to
resolve.9 However, the underlying problem, as in the other men-
tioned types of legal relationships, is whether or not the contractor
has acquired an "economic interest" in the natural deposit1 0
In a recent case, McCall v. Commissioner," the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit was called upon to decide whether, under the
facts involved, independent contractors had a sufficient economic
over-riding royalty owner has an economic interest in the mineral deposit and is
entitled to the depletion allowance).
But, where there are several with economic interests in the same mineral de-
posit, the depletion allowance must be apportioned equitably among them. Equit-
able apportionment is provided for by § 613 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 which
requires that the percentage depletion be applied against "gross income from the
property excluding from such gross income an amount equal to any rents or royal-
ties paid or incurred by the taxpayer in respect to the property."
Example. A leases coal-bearing lands to B on condition that B will annually
pay a royalty of 25 cents a ton on coal mined and sold by B. During the year 1956,
B mines and sells f.o.b. mine xoo,ooo tons of coal for $6oo,ooo. In computing
"gross income from the property" for the year 1956, B will exclude $25,000 (1oo,ooo
tons x $o.25) in computing his allowable percentage depletion deduction. B's al-
lowable percentage depletion deduction (without reference to the limitation based
on taxable income from the property) for the year 1956 will be $57,500 (($6oo,ooo-
$25,000) x 5o percent). Treas. Reg. § s.6i3-2(c)5(i) (1963). A's "gross income from the
property" is $25,ooo and to determine his percentage depletion allowance de-
duction the applicable percentage (io% in this example) will be multiplied times
the $25,ooo he received. See Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312 (1934).
'See 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 24.28 (196o). Usually such contracts
do not mention whether or not the transfer of an interest in the mineral deposit
to the contractor was intended. The contract may not, however, effectively provide
that the contract-miner has an economic interest if in fact he does not. See William
M. Legg, 39 T.C. 21, 28 (1962).
"Also to be considered is the problem of whether or not the other party to
the contract (mineral owner or long-term lessee) must suffer a reduction of his
percentage depletion allowance by having to reduce his "gross income from the
property," to which the percentage depletion fraction is applied, by the amount
of his payment (in kind or in money) to the independent contractor. See Com-
missioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1954), where, through
the consolidation of two cases, both facets of the problem were involved.
9Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 313 (1956).
"Supra note 2.
21312 F.2d 699 (4 th Cir. 1963).
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interest in the mineral in place to be entitled to a percentage deple-
tion allowance deduction.
In the McCall case, taxpayer-contractors had obligated themselves
to extract by deep mining12 and to deliver coal from a certain lease-
hold interest to Norman Mining Company, which had a twenty-year
lease right to mine the property. The term of the contract with
taxpayer-contractors was made coextensive with the term of the mining
company's lease. Under the provisions of the contract, taxpayer-
contractors were to furnish all the machinery and labor, maintain
all roads, lay all track, etc., for the deep-mining operation. Taxpayers
were given the exclusive right to do the mining. They were to be paid
a fixed price per ton delivered with a provision for adjustment due
to market fluctuation. The mining company reserved the right, if by
reason of economic conditions it was unable to sell at a reasonable
profit the coal mined and delivered to it by taxpayers, to require tax-
payers to suspend mining upon twenty-four hours notice. The contract
further provided, however, that "either party may terminate this
Contract, without cause, after thirty (30) days notice, in writing, to
the other party, of his or its intention so to do."' 3 The Court of Ap-
peals, in affirming the Tax Court, held that taxpayers did not have
such an "economic interest" in the coal in place as to entitle them to
a depletion allowance deduction.
Development of the "economic interest" concept began in Palmer
v. Bender,14 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1933. In
that case the Court held that two lessees had acquired an "economic
interest" in oil in place even though legal title was in their lessor, in
retaining an overriding royalty by transferring their operating rights
to two oil companies, they had retained an "economic interest" in the
oil in place. In holding that their retained "economic interest" entitled
them to a depletion allowance deduction,15 the Supreme Court said:
-"Deep mining involves the sinking of shafts or the driving of slopes or drifts
from the surface into the mineral deposit and the underground development of
entries or galleries from which the mineral is removed for transportation to the
surface." ig Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 276 n.1 (1962).
33 12 F.2d at 701. (Emphasis added by the court.)
14287 U.S. 551 (1933).
'Previous to the Palmer v. Bender decision, many of the judicial decisions
and administrative rulings generally took the position that the right to the de-
pletion allowance deduction rested upon considerations of title, necessitating highly
technical differentiations between an assignment and a sublease. The struggle revolv-
ed around the right of a lessee to the allowance after he had transferred his operat-
ing rights, while retaining an overriding royalty. See 4 Mertens, Federal Income Tax-
ation § 24.20 (1960).
The United States Supreme Court, in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267
1963]
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"The language of the statute [providing for depletion allow-
ance] is broad enough to provide, at least, for every case in
which the taxpayer [claimant] has acquired, by investment,
any interest in the oil [or other natural deposit] in place, and
secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from
the extraction of the oil [or other natural deposit], to which he
must look for a return of his capital."'u
Following the decision in the Palmer case, the "economic interest"
test was incorporated in the regulations, in its present wording, as
follows:
"Annual depletion deductions are allowed only to the owner
of an economic interest in mineral deposits.... An economic
interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has ac-
quired by investment any interest in mineral in place. . and
secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from
the extraction of the mineral. .. , to which he must look for a
return of his capital. But a person who has no capital invest-
ment in the mineral deposit. .. does not possess an economic
interest merely because through a contractual relation he pos-
sesses a mere economic or pecuniary advantage derived from
production. For example, an agreement between the owner of
an economic interest and another entitling the latter.., to com-
pensation for extraction ... does not convey a depletable eco-
nomic interest."' 7
It was in this setting, before the Supreme Court decided Parsons
v. Smith's in 1959, that the Tax Court and the lower federal courts
dealt with the problem of what factors would result in a contract-
U.S. 364 (1925) settled this question by holding that "property interest," and "not
legal title," was the test and that a royalty owner had a property interest in the
natural deposit in place, although he did not have legal title.
The differences between Palmer v. Bender and Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co.
are two: (i) the Palmer case involved an over-riding royalty owner, whereas the
Lynch case involved a royalty owner, and (2) in the Palmer case, the Court spoke
in terms of "economic interest," whereas in the earlier Lynch case, it spoke in terms
of "property interest."
16287 U.S. at 557.
1 7Treas. Reg. § i.61i-i(b)i (1963). The next to the last sentence in the regula-
tion is the product of a refinement on Palmer made in Helvering v. Bankline Oil
Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
It should be noted that the regulation is not comprehensive in its definition.
The regulation undertakes only to state extremes. Cf. 4 Mertens, Federal Income
Taxation § 24.19(a) n.99 (ig6o).
16359 U.S. 215 (959)-
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producer having such an "economic interest"' 9 as to entitle him to
share the depletion allowance. 20
In the decided cases, the contracts generally contained provisions
dealing with (1) the party required to furnish machinery and equip-
ment to carry out the mining operation, (2) the method and amount of
compensation to the contractor, (3) the rights of the parties regarding
cancellation, and sometimes, (4) the rights of the parties regarding
suspension of operations.
21
A conflict arose between the Third and Fourth Circuits as to the
weight to be given to a contractor's investment in mining equipment,
required to be furnished by him pursuant to the contract. The Fourth
Circuit held in Commissioner v. Hamill Coal Corp.22 that such an
investment resulted in the contractor having an economic interest in
the natural deposit. 23 However, the Third Circuit in Parsons v.
Smith24 took a different view of such a capital investment in mining
equipment. The court said:
"[I]t is very doubtful whether investment in equipment of gen-
eral utility in a contractor's business is the type of capital ex-
penditure which can properly be found to constitute an invest-
ment in a particular mineral deposit which the contractor has
undertaken to work. ' 25
The factor given the most prominence by the Circuit Courts, in
deciding whether or not a contractor has acquired an economic inter-
est, has been the existence or absence of a provision in the contract
""At first blush the phrase 'economic interest' appears to be simple in mean-
ing. Like so many other simple expressions in the tax law, however, that phrase
has given rise to considerable litigation and presumably will continue to do so
for sometime." 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 24,19 n.97 (196o).
2OHelvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312 (1934). See supra note
6.
"See Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., infra note 33.
'239 F.2d 347 (4 th Cir. 1956). The Tax court in Walter Bernard McCall, 27
T.C. 133 (1956), made a similar holding on substantially the same operative facts.
This case was not appealed.
2 The court in Hamill points out in its opinion, as an additional consideration,
that the contractor had the sole right to carry out the mining operation. No
mention is made in the opinion, however, of a provision in the contract, disclosed
in the court's statement of the facts, which gave to either party, after one year,
the right to cancel the contract without cause.
In Commissioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1954), the
court held that the contractor had an economic interest in the deposit even though
the necessary mining equipment was furnished to the contractor by the other party,
a long-term lessee, pursuant to the contract. In this case, the contract was not
terminable without cause.
:255 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1958).
-Id. at 599.
1963]
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giving the other party, a mineral owner or a long-term lessee, the
right to short-term cancellation without cause. In cases involving
contracts providing for such cancellation, the courts usually held
that the contractor had not acquired an economic interest in the
deposit.26 On the other hand, in two cases decided by the Fourth
Circuit, involving contracts cancellable only for cause, the court held
that the contractor had acquired an economic interest in the mineral
deposit.
2 7
The United States Supreme Court in Parsons v. Smith,28 decided
in 1959, interpreted the economic interest requirement, established by
it in the Palmer case, and held that a contract-miner whose contract
was terminable by the mineral owner without cause on short notice
had not acquired an economic interest in the mineral deposit. In the
Parsons case, the Court listed seven factors in support of its con-
dusion:
"(i) that petitioners' investments were in their equipment, all
of which was movable-not in the coal in place; (2) that their
investments in equipment were recoverable through deprecia-
tion-not depletion; (3) that the contracts were completely
terminable without cause on short notice; (4) that the land-
owners did not agree to surrender and did not actually sur-
render to petitioners any capital interest in the coal in place;
(5) that the coal at all times, even after it was mined, belonged
entirely to the landowners, and that petitioners could not sell
or keep any of it but were required to deliver all that they
mined to the landowners; (6) -that petitioners were not to have
any part of the proceeds of the sale of the coal, but, on the
contrary, they were to be paid a fixed sum for each ton mined
and delivered.., and (7) that petitioners, thus, agreed to look
only to the landowners for all sums to become due them under
their contracts." 29
In the McCall case, the Fourth Circuit said "the Parsons deci-
sion.. . constituted a marked shift in emphasis if not in basic law...
of the circumstances where a depletion deduction could lawfully be
claimed." 30 The court then proceeded to say that the determining
'Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3 d Cir. 1959); Parsons v.
Smith, 255 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1958); Emil Usibelli, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 585 (1954),
aff'd, 229 F.2d 539 (9 th Cir. 1955). But cf. Commissioner v. Hamill Coal Corp., supra.
notes 22 8- 23.
"Stillwell v. United States, 25o F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v.
Gregory Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 52 (4 th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828
(1954). See supra notes 22 & 23. Also see James Ruston, 19 T.C. 284 (1952).
"359 U.S. 215 (1959).
"Id. at 225.
'*312 F.2d at 706. The court of necessity had to conclude that the Parsons
case constituted a "marked shift in emphasis if not in basic law" in order to
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factor is whether or not the contract is subject to termination by
the owner or long-term lessee and not the extent of the taxpayer's
capital expenditure.3 ' Applying that test, the court concluded that
the contractor was not entitled to share in the depletion allowance,
since the contractor's rights under the contract were subject to short-
term cancellation without cause and he, therefore, had no economic in-
terest in the mineral deposit.3 2 It is submitted -that the court is wrong,
both in asserting that Parsons brought about a shift in the law and in
holding that capital investment is no longer important. First, the
Parsons decision did not shift emphasis or change the law; it merely
emphasized the factors to be considered in determining whether or
not an economic interest has been acquired by a contract-miner. The
Court in Parsons makes it clear that the interest "acquired by invest-
ment" statement made by it in Palmer had reference to investment in
the mineral in place and not investment in equipment used to extract
the mineral. When the Court shifted from "property interest" to
"economic interest" in Palmer, it was recognizing, perhaps, that
"economic interest" is a broader concept than "property interest"
and that, although all "property interests" are "economic interests,"
the reverse is not necessarily true. And, in speaking of interests ac-
quired by investment, the Court was probably recognizing that
those "economic interests" which are "property interests" are many
times acquired by purchase. Second, capital investment may still be an
important consideration in other than contract-mining cases.
None of the contract-mining cases, including Parsons, undertake
to do more than state that the presence or absence of terminability on
short notice without cause will result in the contractor not acquiring
or acquiring, as the case may be, an economic interest. Such statements
seem to be no more than assertions, but it is submitted that there is a
rational underlying explanation for such conclusions.
A contract-miner, with the right to mine to exhaustion, is in
the same position in this respect as a long-term lessee who does not
necessarily have to have any investment in the mineral in place. There
is one inherent distinction between the usual contractor's position
avoid the application of res judicata. This same question on identical facts had
been litigated in a previous year. In the previous litigation, the taxpayer prevailed
in the Tax Court, and the decision was not appealed. See supra note 22.
"'See Stilwell v. United States, 250 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1957). For two recent
Tax Court holdings to the same effect as the McCall holding, See Raymond E.
Cooper, 39 T.C. 188 (1962); William M. Legg, 39 T.C. 21 (1962).
=The Supreme Court holding in the Parsons case and the Fourth Circuit
holding in the McCall case necessarily nullify the Fourth Circuit's holding in the
Hamill case, supra note 22.
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and the usual lessee's position. The agreement between a mineral
owner or a long-term lessee and the contract-miner usually pro-
vides that the contractor will extract and make delivery to the owner,
or long-term lessee, as the case may be, of a controlled volume of the
mineral. In this respect the contractor is in the position of the usual
royalty owner; he has no control over production.
When the contractor enters into a contract which is terminable only
for cause, he, like a royalty owner, a long-term lessee, or an over-riding
royalty owner, looks to the entire deposit for the "possibility of profit."
On the other hand if the contract is terminable on short notice with-
out cause, the contractor has no right to expect his profit to be meas-
ured by the entire deposit. In such a case there is no analogy which
can be made to the lease situations, and the contractor is nothing
more than a hireling, deriving an economic advantage from the con-
tract, while in force.
33
LEONARD SARGEANT, III
'Viewed as having such an underlying rational basis, the holdings of two cases,
otherwise difficult to understand, become justifiable.
In Commissioner v. Mammoth Coal Co., 229 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956), an owner had entered into an agreement with a strip-
ping contractor, giving it the exclusive right to mine certain coal veins. The
contract was not cancellable without cause but did give the owner the right to
suspend production indefinitely on five days notice. In the event of such suspension,
the contractor had the right to cancel the contract. The court held that the con-
tractor had acquired an economic interest entitling it to share the depletion al-
lowance. Based on an analogy to lease situations, the decision seems to be sound.
A lessee inherently has the right to give up his lease. This inherent right, how-
ever, does not impair his entitlement to the depletion allowance deduction. Also, an
owner's power to suspend the contract-miner's production would not be incon-
consistent with the contractor having an economic interest in the deposit. When
and if production is resumed, the contractor has the exclusive right to extract
the mineral; the contractor has retained his right to look to the entire deposit for
"the possibility of profit."
The other case is Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F..d 531
(4 th Cir. 1956). In that case the contractor's right to mine the mineral was termin-
able by the owner on short notice without cause. The Fourth Circuit held that
the contractor had an economic interest in the deposit. In so holding, the court
relied on its decision in Commissioner v. Hamill Coal Corp., 239 F.2d 347 (4th Cir.
1956). The decision of the Supreme Court in the Parsons case necessarily nullified the
holding of the Fourth Circuit in the Hamill case; but it did not nullify, necessar-
ily, the holding in Weirton. There was a peculiar twist in the Weirton facts; if
the owner cancelled the contract, the owner was obliged to reconvey the property
to the contractor, who had conveyed it to the owner as part of the production
contract arrangement. Thus, the contractor had the exclusive right to mine to
exhaustion whether or not the contract was terminated.
